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 In choosing this topic, where we are in the war on terror and how we got there, 
it occurred to me that it would be an appropriate topic for me to address, not only 
because it is a subject that I have been involved with on and off for about eighteen 
years—ever since a prosecution that eventually came to be known as United States v. 
Rahman1 landed on my desk as a federal district judge—but also because we have just 
celebrated (if that is the word), quietly (and that definitely is the word), what was to 
have been the one-year anniversary of the closing of the facility at Guantánamo 
Bay.
 Now, as you all know, the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay is still open. So 
I thought I would deal with that topic, how it came to remain open, and also where 
we are on the war on Islamist terrorism. This entails a discussion of not only why 
Guantánamo is still open, but also how we got here, and perhaps where we are likely 
to go. I am going to provide some historical review, both to help find answers to 
these questions and so that you can understand why the answers are somewhat less 
than definite and a good deal less than satisfactory.
 Based on the evidence that I have seen, the first encounter of this country with 
Islamist terrorism did not start on September 11, 2001, or indeed on February 26, 
1993, which is the date of what was then known as the World Trade Center bombing 
and later became known as the first World Trade Center bombing. It began in the 
late 1980s, specifically, at a shooting range out in Calverton, Long Island, when a 
group of FBI agents approached what they thought was a bunch of people who were 
taking rather aggressive target practice. The agents thought that they would give the 
group a “toss,” as they say in the business, and get their identification, and so on. 
These people put off the FBI, challenged them, and said that the agents were engaged 
in what is now known as profiling. The agents, being polite and politically correct, 
backed off.
 Fast forward to 1990. In November of 1990, a right-wing Israeli politician named 
Meir Kahane was assassinated at a ballroom here in Manhattan after giving a speech. 
The assailant was quickly caught—a man named El Sayyid Nosair. It was immediately 
pronounced to be the lone act of a lone actor. The case wound up being so overtried, 
notwithstanding that Nosair had committed the crime in front of an audience about 
as large as this one, that he was actually acquitted of murder. But he was convicted of 
using the gun with which he had committed the murder, and was sentenced to seven 
and one-third years to twenty-two years in jail. What we now refer to as jihadi 
literature was seized from his apartment. It discussed, among other things, toppling 
tall buildings in order to bring down western civilization. But nobody paid any 
attention to that; it was put in a warehouse and went largely unexamined.
 It was not, however, an isolated act by an isolated actor. In February 1993, the 
first World Trade Center bombing occurred, killing six people, injuring hundreds of 
others, and causing millions of dollars of property damage. Among the demands of 
those who carried out that bombing was the demand that Nosair be released from 
jail. When an amateur video of Kahane’s speech was reviewed, it was discovered that 
1. 189 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999).
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one of the people involved in the 1993 bombing was actually present in the ballroom 
that night. In fact, Nosair was supposed to have made his escape by getting into a 
cab that was driven by another of the 1993 plotters, but he jumped into the wrong 
cab and therefore was captured. Also, it turned out that those people, Nosair, and 
others had been present on that day in Calverton, Long Island, when the FBI agents 
challenged them for taking aggressive target practice.
 The response to the 1993 bombing was, of course, the conventional response—
bring the perpetrators to justice. And they were brought to justice; the 1993 bombers 
were convicted at a separate trial. Their spiritual leader, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, 
known as the blind sheik, and nine or so others, including Nosair, were convicted of 
an overarching plot that included the Kahane murder, the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing, and a plan to blow up landmarks around New York City. I should tell you 
that one of the other goals of that conspiracy was to assassinate Egypt’s President 
Hosni Mubarak when he visited New York—shades of today’s headlines. Abdel 
Rahman, even at that time, had an impressive background. He was not only the 
spiritual advisor behind the 1993 bombing; he had been the spiritual advisor to the 
assassins of Anwar Sadat in 1981, and he was later, from jail, to issue the fatwa that 
provided Osama bin Laden with a theological justification for 9/11.
 Here I should add that, given what is going on in Egypt today, the western world 
is, I think, quite fortunate that Abdel Rahman is in jail because he is the sort of 
charismatic figure who actually could have been, and in fact aspired to be, an 
Egyptian Khomeini,2 complete with recorded sermons distributed to his followers. 
The possibility of a bad outcome today would be a lot more substantial if he were on 
the street. Although the 1993 bombing led, I think, to the debut of the phrase 
“wake-up call,” in fact there was virtually no public focus at the time on what we 
were really dealing with and what we were up against.
 I stated that from what I have seen, this country’s first encounter with Islamists, 
or Islamism, occurred in the late 1980s out in Calverton, Long Island. But that was 
not Islamism’s first encounter with this country. The first encounter actually goes 
back to the late 1940s, when a man named Sayyid Qutb, who had been something of 
a hell-raiser in Egypt, won a traveling fellowship, largely to get him out of the 
country. Qutb chose to travel to the United States. Specifically, he went to Greeley, 
Colorado. Now, it would be hard to think of a more placid place than Greeley, 
Colorado, in the late 1940s. But Qutb was absolutely mortified by what he saw. The 
haircuts, the enthusiasm for sports, the political system, the mingling of the sexes in 
church—Qutb was outraged. He went back to Egypt, quit the civil service, and 
joined up with an organization that was already in existence, having been founded in 
the 1920s, called the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood had been 
2. Born in Iran in 1902, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was a young seminary teacher who later become a 
leader of the Islamic revolution. A man who hated Western ways, he seized the U.S. embassy in Iran 
and held fifty-two persons hostage. Khomeini, who died in 1989, was responsible for the deaths of 
thousands during the last decade of his life. See Milton Viorst, Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, TIME 
Mag. (Apr. 13, 1998), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,988165,00.html. 
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founded in Egypt by a man called Hassan al-Banna, who was assassinated the year 
that Qutb left for the United States.
 Although the Muslim Brotherhood welcomed Gamal Abdel Nasser’s coup in 
19523 against the British monarchy, believing that it would end corruption and bring 
about an Islamist state, they again were disappointed when Nasser did not even ban 
the consumption of alcohol. Qutb continued his agitation, was in and out of jail, was 
eventually hanged in 1966, and became something of a contemporary saint. Many 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood fled to Saudi Arabia, where they found refuge 
and ideological sustenance. Qutb’s brother, Muhammad Qutb, was among those 
who fled, and he taught the doctrine in Saudi Arabia. Among his students was a 
man named Ayman al-Zawahri, an Egyptian, who was number two in al-Qaeda, 
second to Osama bin Laden, and bin Laden himself then simply the pampered child 
of one of the richest construction families in Saudi Arabia.
 In 1996, and reiterated in 1998, was bin Laden’s declaration of war on the United 
States, which I think was treated here in the United States as quaint. Imagine some 
fellow in a cave in Afghanistan declaring war on the United States. Then came the 
bombing of the East African embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The response 
was another “Bring them to justice!” series of calls and actually an indictment that 
named bin Laden as a co-defendant. Regrettably, bin Laden did not seem to have 
been impressed, or at least if he was impressed he was not deterred, because in 2000 
we had the bombing of the USS Cole. This had actually been preceded by an attempt 
to bomb another U.S. destroyer called The Sullivans, which failed only because the 
barge carrying the explosives sank.
 Throughout this period we heard about terrorism, but not about what the people 
who were practicing terrorism thought. And unless you attended one or another of 
the trials involved, there was no suggestion that we should do anything other than 
round up the perpetrators after the fact and bring them to justice. Notwithstanding 
bin Laden’s declarations, plural, of war and his detailed description of his grounds 
for the declarations, all of this came upon us as something of a surprise on September 
11, 2001, when we finally got specific, or should have gotten specific, about what we 
were supposed to be waking up to.
 President George W. Bush promised to put things on a different footing. To the 
cries of “Bring them to justice!” was added the cry, “Bring justice to them.” But, 
regrettably, there was not, in fact, time to work out a long-term strategy and a clear 
focus on precisely what we were dealing with. It was announced we were involved in 
a war on terror—not a war on Islamist terror and certainly not a war on militant 
Islamism. And it is hard, for a number of reasons, to blame anybody involved, 
including the President. This war was something that had to be fit into the grid of 
American domestic life and political history, and we were very much on guard at the 
time, and still are, against the repetition of our treatment of the Japanese during 
3. Appointed in 1954, Gamal Abdel Nasser was the second president of the Arab Republic of Egypt. “He 
was the first native Egyptian to rule Egypt in over 2500 years.” Arab Unity: Nasser’s Revolution, Al 
Jazeera (June 20, 2008), http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/arabunity/2008/02/200852517252821627.
html. 
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World War II and of fomenting religious and ethnic tension in this country. We are 
also a society that is reluctant to examine other people’s religions.
 For those two reasons we shun the notion of a war on any movement that is, or 
claims to be, inspired by a religion. Indeed, President Bush went out of his way to 
avoid inf laming passions, going so far as to tell us that, as he put it, “Islam is a 
religion of peace.” Second, there was a sense within the Bush administration that 
this was not simply about an organization called al-Qaeda, based in Afghanistan, but 
that it was about a more widespread tendency—although it remained unclear how 
widespread, and precisely what, that was.
 There has been of course a great deal of discussion about whether the word “war” 
adequately describes the War on Terror in either intellectual or practical terms, and I 
can probably spend all my time here discussing that issue alone. I think it is enough 
to suggest that it is the most serviceable term that we have, and “war” is certainly a 
lot better, in my view, than the term “foreign contingency operation,” which is the 
term favored by the current secretary of Homeland Security. I do acknowledge that 
there are not only intellectual and practical difficulties with the term “war,” but there 
are legal difficulties as well if we are talking about building a legal architecture that 
not only gives the President the powers that he needs but at the same time allows for 
the kind of accountability for the use of those powers that can sustain them over a 
long period of time.
 To put it in very mundane terms, it is very hard to sustain public awareness of a 
war when everybody can still make restaurant reservations and go to the movies. 
Despite a certain lack of strategic focus, there were, in fact, many successes during 
those first years of the War on Terror, the most notable being that there were, for the 
seven-plus years following 9/11, no successful attacks on this country. A great deal of 
this success, I believe, was due to the CIA interrogation program, which involved 
sifting through literally tens of thousands of detainees, focusing on those who seemed 
to have the most potential for providing us with intelligence, and questioning them, 
even vigorously at times.
 CIA agents were knowledgeable in—and people other than those who actually 
debriefed the detainees were schooled in—what became known as “enhanced 
interrogation techniques,” which I think was probably one of the worst public 
relations campaigns since New Coke. It sounds like a washday product, doesn’t it? I 
think harsh techniques, or coercive techniques, would have been a whole lot more 
accurate, and in the end a whole lot less harmful because when you use a euphemism 
like “enhanced,” it sounds as if you are trying to hide something that you believe to 
be horrible and that you are ashamed of. I think that was a disastrous choice.
 We actually learned a great deal through the CIA program. In fact, if you focus 
on only three of the detainees, Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (also 
known as KSM), and Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, you find that we got a huge trove of 
information. Zubaydah was a lieutenant high up and close to Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed and close to Osama bin Laden. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, I think, 
needs no introduction to this audience; he was the man who planned 9/11. And 
Nashiri was the man who was the architect of the USS Cole attacks.
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 Some important things we learned from Zubaydah, according to George Tenet 
and General Michael Hayden, both former heads of the CIA, included information 
that led to the arrest of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who was the operational supervisor of 
9/11. We frustrated an attack on the Canary Wharf in England and on London’s 
Heathrow Airport. We got Jose Padilla, known for plotting to plant a dirty bomb in 
this country and actually prosecuted for something a whole lot more doable and a 
whole lot more sinister: namely, getting apartments in Florida, filling them with gas, 
and then detonating them using cell phones.
 We also learned from Zubaydah that it was okay for members of al-Qaeda to talk 
when they reached the breaking point, so long as they resisted to that limit. He said 
at one point, “Do this for all the brothers.” That is, bring them to the breaking point. 
And that was something that proved enormously valuable with Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed when we finally captured him because, when he finally got to the 
breaking point, he gave chalk talks. He became a lecturer on the subject of al-Qaeda, 
how it was organized, how it moved money, and how it attracted adherents.
 We also learned specific information from KSM that resulted in the capture of 
people who were planning to develop a biological weapons capability in this country. 
And on and on. Nashiri, who was giving us stale information at the beginning, 
wound up giving us information that was a whole lot fresher after he was interrogated 
by the CIA.
 So far as devising a way of dealing with terrorists when they came within the 
jurisdiction of our legal system, that is a somewhat less successful story. President 
Bush signed an executive order that there were to be military commissions right 
away. But there was a delay in implementing them, due in part to negotiations with 
our allies, including the British, who at first insisted that their nationals be tried first 
and then objected to many features of the military commissions, which of course 
would have had to apply to everyone. In the end, the U.S. government released 
several British nationals to Great Britain rather than adjust the procedures, including 
some British nationals who were plainly guilty of war crimes.
 When a mechanism was finally put in place and military commission trials were 
ready to begin, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to permit President Bush on his own 
authority to establish a system of military commissions, and so the Congress 
obligingly passed the Military Commissions Act.4 By the time the legal challenges 
to the act had been exhausted, the principal architects of 9/11 were in custody—
including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the others who would never have been 
captured but for the CIA program.
 We were at the point where Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s trial was ready to start. 
He had offered to plead guilty. But by the time that happened, we had a new 
President, and President Barack Obama disclosed that he would, number one, close 
Guantánamo within the year, and, number two, immediately shut down the CIA 
interrogation program and limit interrogation techniques to the Army Field Manual, 
4. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
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which is generally available on the Internet and has been used for decades as a 
training manual for terrorists.5 Additionally, President Obama shut down the military 
commissions pending a study, which as far as I know has not yet been completed.
 The point of these orders, according to the Obama administration, was to 
“restore” standards of due process, and constitutional standards generally, and to 
retake the moral high ground. I do not know how many of you saw the videotape of 
the signing of these orders, but there was one moment that I found especially telling. 
After President Obama signed the order to close Guantánamo, he asked whether 
anybody had prepared or drafted an order for any procedures on how the closing was 
going to be done, and a voice off-camera said that they were working on it. For me, 
that was a terrifying moment.
 As regards Guantánamo, it is a military, not a CIA, facility. I visited Guantánamo 
in February of 2008. It is a state-of-the-art detention and trial facility. I have visited 
not only maximum security but medium security facilities in this country, including, 
principally, federal facilities, and I will tell you that Guantánamo compares favorably 
with them. I was able to see the high-value detainees, other than Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed, being monitored on closed-circuit television. KSM was out of his cell 
visiting with a delegation from the International Committee of the Red Cross so 
that he could report to them on how terribly he was being treated. Nonetheless, I did 
get to visit his cell and found that it included, in the adjoining room, an exercise 
facility that included an elliptical machine that was the same make and model as the 
one I used to use at the Lansburgh when I was attorney general, except that KSM 
did not have to wait in line at the gym every morning.
 The courtroom that exists at Guantánamo is enormously expensive. It can handle 
high-security detainees and has an advanced computer system that can easily handle 
classified information. The medical care at Guantánamo given to the prisoners is 
better than the medical care given to their captors. The library includes many Islamic 
books and other titles, as well as DVDs, but somehow the most popular title, at least 
when I was down there, was Walker, Texas Ranger.
 That is not to say that there is no violence at Guantánamo. There is plenty of 
violence, but it is directed by the prisoners at the guards, not the other way around. 
The guards have to wear plastic face shields when they walk the corridors and, of 
course, when they go anywhere near the cells, to protect themselves against the 
cocktails of feces, urine, spittle, semen, and other liquids that are thrown at them on 
a regular basis.
 As noted before, the Army Field Manual is now the limit of interrogation and, of 
course, available as a training method on the Internet. The Manual is limited to 
techniques that can be used by the most raw recruit. So if what is permissible is four 
feet wide, the Army Field Manual sets the limit at two feet.
 The current attorney general, Eric H. Holder, Jr., said during the 2008 presidential 
campaign that the prior administration had, in his words,
5. Dep’t of the Army, Field Manual 27-10: The Law of Land Warfare ¶ 31 (1956), http://www.
loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law_warfare-1956.pdf.
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authorized the use of torture, approved of secret electronic surveillance against 
American citizens, secretly detained American citizens without due process 
of law, denied the writ of habeas corpus to hundreds of accused enemy 
combatants and authorized the use of procedures that violate both international 
law and the United States Constitution.6
 The reckoning began in April 2009 with the release of the U.S. Department of 
Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memos that analyzed the CIA interrogation 
techniques and described why the techniques were lawful. That release was intended, 
I think, to create a furor. The furor did not develop, but the memos did disclose, of 
course, to any terrorist that was reading them, the limits to which the United States 
would go in interrogations. But there was no outrage; in fact, in response, it was 
obvious that the CIA and the Justice Department had gone to inordinate lengths to 
avoid violating the torture statute.
 Holder then announced that he was reopening the investigations of the CIA 
agents who had conducted interrogations. These investigations had been closed years 
before with detailed prosecution memos describing why they were closed. When 
Holder announced that he was reopening the investigations, he conceded that he had 
made that announcement and that decision without reading those prosecution 
memos. In June of 2009, Ahmed Ghailani, who had been indicted for the East Africa 
bombings and was being charged at Guantánamo with other crimes as well, was 
brought from Guantánamo to the United States to stand trial.7
 In a piece of bad timing, in November of 2009, Captain Nidal Malik Hasan, 
who had been in touch with Anwar al-Awlaki, the spiritual advisor to a couple of 
9/11 plotters, shouted, “Allahu Akbar,”8 before he shot soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas. 
He killed thirteen soldiers and wounded about thirty. President Obama told us that 
we should not jump to conclusions. Three days later, also in November of 2009, 
Attorney General Holder directed an end to the military commissions proceedings 
against Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and announced that he was going to bring KSM 
to the United States and, specifically, to the Southern District of New York, to stand 
trial. Holder announced that doing so would somehow uphold the rule of law. Which 
law, I have no idea. Certainly not the Military Commissions Act because that act 
directs that people who are charged with war crimes be tried before military 
commissions.
 Not only was this action, in essence, a failure to uphold the Military Commissions 
Act, it was also a frustration of something we have been trying to do for several 
hundreds of years—civilize the laws of war. Essentially the rule is that if you wear 
uniforms, follow a recognized chain of command, carry your arms openly, and do 
6. Andrew C. McCarthy, ‘The Right Man’ to Protect us from Terror?, National Review Online (Jan. 13, 
2009), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/226682/right-man-protect-us-terror/andrew-c-mccarthy.
7. See Peter Finn, Guantanamo Bay Detainee Brought to U.S. for Trial Move is Part of Obama’s Plan to Close 
Prison, Wash. Post, June 10, 2009, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2009/06/09/AR2009060900401.html.
8. “Allahu Akbar,” which means “Allah is the greatest,” is the opening declaration of every Islamic prayer.
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not target civilians, then you have certain rights, and one thing that happens is you 
are held until hostilities are over.
 The decision to move KSM was the U.S. government saying that if you violate 
all of those rules, you get an even better deal—you get to come to a courtroom, you 
get a platform, you get a lawyer, and you get the possibility of an acquittal. In 
Christmas of 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian citizen, was caught 
trying to set off a bomb in his underwear over Detroit. Instead of being treated as an 
intelligence asset, he was treated as a criminal defendant and given Miranda warnings, 
notwithstanding the fact that the only advantage of Miranda warnings is that they 
allow you to use a statement. Given the fact that Abdulmutallab had committed his 
crime in front of a couple of hundred witnesses, the need for his statement is, I think, 
open to question.
 It is too bad that we did not use Abdulmutallab as an intelligence asset 
immediately because the bomb that he tried to set off was the same type of bomb 
that would later be used by bomb makers who were shipping packages into this 
country several months ago. Had we been able to find out where Abdulmutallab had 
gotten his training and who trained him, that incident could conceivably have been 
prevented. After the incident, the director of National Intelligence suggested that 
Abdulmutallab should have been interrogated right away under the program for 
interrogating high-value detainees. This program was supposed to replace the CIA 
program that had been abolished right after the inauguration of President Obama. 
The trouble was that the program was not functional at the time Abdulmutallab was 
captured.
 Although that program was not up and running, I should tell you that the 
reopened investigation of the CIA agents who conducted the interrogations, which 
had been closed years before, was very much up and running and was calling 
witnesses before the grand jury at the time. This, I think, is a very eloquent illustration 
of the priorities that were in force.
 On May 1, 2010, the New York City Police Department discovered a primitive 
explosive device in an SUV parked near Times Square in New York City. If it had 
gone off, it would have killed hundreds; but it did not, of course, and the incident 
was treated dismissively at the beginning by many, including by New York City 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who said he thought it would ultimately be found that 
the device had been planted by somebody who was upset about the health care reform 
bill.
 It turned out that the person who planted the bomb, Faisal Shahzad, if he had 
any views about the health care bill, had not been motivated by them when he set the 
device. In fact, he had been trained by the Pakistan Taliban, who helped him do it.
 Even though the principal value of both Shahzad and Abdulmutallab when they 
were captured was as intelligence assets, the main emphasis was on criminal 
prosecution. And as a result of this emphasis, a rich trove of information, I would 
suggest to you, was forfeited.
 The Ghailani trial appears to have been intended as a demonstration to show 
that we could try any Guantánamo detainee in a civilian court and thus serve as the 
18
The war oN Terror: where we are aNd how we GoT There
basis for an argument that the expressed concerns over trying Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed here in a civilian court were misplaced. Inasmuch as Ghailani had been 
indicted years before, the case had been investigated years before as a case that was to 
be presented in a federal court, rather than as a case based on evidence captured on 
the battlefield.
 In other words, even if the trial of Ghailani had been a complete success, it 
would not have shown that we could try Guantánamo detainees in a civilian court. 
However, the trial was not a success; it failed in a number of respects, including 
suppression of the testimony of a key witness against Ghailani, and it resulted in his 
acquittal on a couple hundred murder counts. Ghailani was convicted on only one 
count, and that was conspiracy to destroy government property resulting in death.
 Since 9/11, more than two dozen Islamist plots have been aimed at this country, 
including not only those of Major Hasan, Abdulmutallab, and Shahzad, but also 
those of Najibullah-I Zazi and his cohorts, who are under prosecution in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York for an alleged plot to detonate 
explosives in the United States; Bryant Neal Vinas and his plot against commuter 
railroads and subways in this city; plotters who planned attacks on military personnel 
at Fort Dix, Quantico, Virginia, and Goose Creek, South Carolina; individuals who 
murdered an army recruiter in Little Rock, Arkansas, and planned to blow up a 
synagogue in Riverdale, New York, an office building in Dallas, and a courthouse in 
Illinois; and many, many others.
 Yet, the criminal law paradigm is still setting the limit of the response. Attorney 
General Holder continues to press for a civilian trial for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
and others. Holder says that is not off the table; they were scheduled long ago to 
begin their military trials at Guantánamo. Nashiri was supposed to have already 
been tried at Guantánamo in connection with the USS Cole bombing. His trial began 
and then it was stopped. We are now told that his trial has been put back on the 
rails.
 It is true that Guantánamo remains open, but it is also true that President Obama 
remains committed as ever to closing it and to figuring out a way to release those 
who are there, despite a growing body of evidence that alumni of Guantánamo have 
returned to the battlefield in startling numbers. An interview with a man named 
Sheikh Abu Sufyan Al-Azdi provides a recent example. Al-Azdi is a deputy 
commander of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is a group based in Yemen. 
This interview was published in the October 2010 issue of al-Qaeda’s English 
magazine called Inspire.9 For those of you do not have a subscription to Inspire, I will 
tell you that you can get a copy of the article on a website called Middle East Media 
Research Institute (MEMRI), which translates articles of that sort and others. It is a 
real eye-opener. Al-Azdi, who was released from Guantánamo, was turned over to 
the Saudis for participation in their celebrated re-education program. However, 
9. MEMRI, http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/report.htm?report=3961&param=APT (last visited 
June 1, 2011) (subscription required); see also Interview with Shaykh Abu Sufyan: The Vice Emir of Al-Qaida 
in the Arabian Peninsula, Flashpoint Partners (Oct. 11, 2010), http://www.f lashpoint-intel.com/
images/documents/pdf/1010/f lashpoint_abusufyaninspire1010.pdf.
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Al-Azdi made his way back to Yemen to resume his jihadi activities. In the Inspire 
interview, Al-Azdi urges Muslims to emulate Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, and 
Abdulmutallab, the Detroit airplane bomber. Al-Azdi is by no means the first 
alumnus to return to the battlefield. In March of 2010, the operational leader of the 
Afghan Taliban announced that he was promoting an alumnus of Guantánamo to 
replace someone who had been killed by one of our drones.
 In fact, more than twenty percent of those released from Guantánamo have 
returned to the battlefield, and those are just the ones we know about because they 
have been recaptured or killed in battle. How many others are still out there? We 
have no idea. With respect to Guantánamo, there is something of a constitutional 
standoff at the moment. President Obama wants to close Guantánamo and bring 
those who are still there to the United States. Congress has said that Obama may not 
use funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose, and so they are at an impasse. 
One alternative that some in the Obama administration, and some outsiders, have 
urged is indefinite detention at Guantánamo with no trials, at least until after the 
2012 presidential election.
 That indefinite detention option has gotten backing even from some highly 
respected people outside the government, including a man named Jack Goldsmith, a 
former assistant U.S. attorney general and someone with whom I ordinarily agree. 
Make no mistake: I am not here as a proponent of military commissions as a policy 
matter—although I think the fact that Congress has passed the Military Commissions 
Act and re-enacted it at the behest of this current administration makes it barely 
short of lawless for the administration to refuse to use military commissions. But I 
certainly agree that the record of proceedings in that forum is not encouraging. For 
example, Omar Khadr, who at the age of 15, without disclosing his identity as a 
combatant, threw a hand grenade that killed one U.S. soldier and maimed another. 
Khadr was tried at Guantánamo and was allowed to plead guilty to get a sentence 
that was capped at eight years. Khadr was further allowed to serve the remainder of 
his sentence in his native Canada, where the laws are such that he is likely to be out 
in a year or two.
 That sentence itself was harsh compared to the sentence of Osama bin Laden’s 
bodyguard and confidant, a man named Salim Hamdan, who gave his name to a 
famous Supreme Court case.10 Hamdan was bin Laden’s driver and was captured 
while in possession of two missiles that were intended for use on U.S. soldiers. 
Anybody who is familiar with organized crime cases knows that the driver is probably 
the most trusted member of the family. The driver is closest to the boss, he is the one 
who is responsible for the boss’s safety, and he is the one who hears everything. 
Notwithstanding that, the military judge could not get his mind around the fact that 
Hamdan was anything more than a mere driver. The prosecution asked for thirty 
years. Hamdan got something short of eight and was released immediately because 
he had already been in custody for longer than that.
10. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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 On the other hand, as I said earlier, trying unlawful combatants in civilian court 
disregards the Military Commissions Act and essentially provides them better 
treatment than what is accorded to those who obey the laws of war. So what are we 
to do? One thing that perhaps ought to be done is to go back to first principles and 
ask why it is we want to have trials, if we even want to have trials.
 After World War II, the Allied Forces held the Nuremberg Trials, essentially for 
two reasons: one was to create a record of what the people involved in the Nazi 
regime had done, and the second reason was punishment. Not everybody at the time 
favored the Nuremberg Tribunals. Winston Churchill, in fact, favored summary 
execution for the senior leadership of the German government; he did not see any 
need for trials. Today we do not need the recordkeeping feature of Nuremberg 
because we have a record of precisely what these people have done and why they have 
done it. I do not think that simple indefinite detention, or even summary execution, 
is a reasonable choice because it fails to provide for what I think the public has a 
legitimate, basic right to and a societal need for. And that is to affix moral blame and 
to impose an appropriate punishment. That is why we have a justice system.
 We have, essentially, a social contract, as you know, in which people give up their 
right to use force in return for the assurance that their government will use force on 
their behalf when necessary. Telling the families of those who were killed on 9/11 
not to worry because we are going to have these people in custody indefinitely, I 
would suggest to you, is a failure on the government’s part of the social contract.
 One solution that is available to Congress is to exercise its constitutional power 
to create a court to try terrorism cases. Article III creates only the Supreme Court. It 
then says that Congress may from time to time ordain and establish such other courts 
as it deems necessary.11 Congress has the power to create courts. Therefore, Congress 
can create a court that can consider any relevant evidence, is not bound by the rules 
of evidence, and can be fashioned to try these cases. This court could be presided 
over by an Article III judge, with the military providing juries and prosecutors.
 That is one alternative that has been proposed and there has been a lot written on 
it. This is not the time to get into a detailed description of how the court would 
work. But that is certainly one alternative to what we have now. The executive 
branch, I think, needs to focus on the nature of the adversary that we are confronting. 
Strategically, there has been not only a failure but an outright act of refusal to consider 
the nature of the adversary we confront, and that is an adversary that is motivated by 
a religiously derived ideology that essentially offers to infidels three choices: 
conversion, dhimmitude,12 or death. We live in a culture, as I said before, in which 
we hesitate to ask questions about other people’s religion. But when that religion is 
something they use as a justification for imposing a system on us, we are very well 
entitled to ask questions about it and draw appropriate conclusions.
11. U.S. Const. art. III.
12. See David B. Kopel, Dhimmitude and Disarmament, 18 Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 305, 305 (2008) 
(“Islamic law, shari’a, forbids non-Muslims, known as dhimmi, from possessing arms and defending 
themselves from attacks by Muslims. The disarmament is one aspect of the pervasive civil inferiority 
imposed on non-Muslims, a status known as dhimmitude.”).
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 Because we are facing a militant ideology that is not focused in any one particular 
place, the only way that we can prevail is to try to stay one jump ahead of those who 
are intent on translating that ideology into concrete action. The only way to do that 
is through intelligence gathering, both electronic intelligence and, when we can get 
it, human intelligence. I would not downplay, as many people have, the value of 
human intelligence. General Michael Hayden, the former director of the CIA, said 
that trying to work based only on electronic intelligence is like trying to solve a 
jigsaw puzzle without looking at the picture on the box. Occasionally, we get hold of 
a person who can describe the picture on the box and that is enormously invaluable.
 However, if we have a program for questioning potentially valuable detainees 
that is limited to the Army Field Manual, which is already available on the web as a 
training manual, then we are going to get virtually nothing from the questioning. 
There are certainly those in the intelligence community who understand the nature 
of the threat and the importance of the intelligence in dealing with the threat. But 
those in charge appear to be strategically myopic. The President’s special assistant, 
Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan, made a speech last year at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies. This speech was given in 2010 by one 
of the White House’s designated deep thinkers on the subject of terrorism. He said 
that to speak of a war on terrorism or a war on terror is highly misleading because 
terrorism is simply a tactic and terror is a state of mind.
 When I heard that speech, I thought back to a great comedic routine that was 
part of a show called Beyond the Fringe, which was a revue that ran on Broadway. 
One of the wonderful bits in that revue involved a harassed Scotland Yard spokesman 
trying to explain why it was that Scotland Yard had failed to solve the Great Train 
Robbery of 1963. The spokesman said that Scotland Yard had been very confused by 
the name: the Great Train Robbery. He said that trains are very large, they are hard 
to conceal, they run on rails, and it is very difficult to make off with them. He said 
that we have investigated this and have found that there is no question at all of a 
missing train. We have the train; it is the contents of the train that are missing.
 That is a very funny bit but it is part of a British farce. The President and the 
national security advisor did not, so far as I know, intend themselves to be participating 
in a British farce when the Deputy National Security Advisor spoke at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies about the War on Terror. When he got to the 
subject of jihad, he cautioned against describing our enemies as jihadists because, as 
he put it, jihad is “a holy struggle, a legitimate tenet of Islam.” And just so nobody 
missed the point, he said that jihad means simply, as he put it, “to purify oneself or 
one’s community.”13 This person, by the way, says he believes that a twenty percent 
recidivism rate from Guantánamo is actually not bad because it compares favorably 
with the recidivism rate in U.S. federal institutions, notwithstanding that we have a 
much more accurate way of keeping track of the alumni of federal institutions than 
of the alumni of Guantánamo.
13. Counterterror Adviser Defends Jihad as ‘Legitimate Tenet of Islam,’ Fox News (May 27, 2010), http://www.
foxnews.com/politics/2010/05/27/counterterror-adviser-defends-jihad-legitimate-tenet-islam/. 
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 Now, we can wish Muslims of a reformist bent all the luck in the world without 
forgetting that it is going to take a struggle within Islam, and not just wishful 
thinking, to change the meaning of jihad or at least the lengths to which some 
Muslims are willing to go in following it. Jihad may indeed involve purification, but 
only in the sense of intensifying one’s own commitment to calling others to the faith, 
spreading Shari’a law, and purifying one’s community of all non-Islamic influences. 
We can wish reform-minded Muslims and moderate Muslims all the luck in the 
world without forgetting that the struggle to spread Shari’a by peaceful means, if 
possible, but by violent means, if necessary, is, in fact, the meaning of jihad within 
the religion.
 Now, I recognize that all religions, my own included, have universalist visions 
and look forward to the day when all people worship in accordance with them. But 
where they differ sharply is on how far they command people to go in bringing that 
day about. For the people in charge to overlook that, or if they have not overlooked 
it, to try to get other people to overlook it is, I suggest to you, a bad way to lead us. 
And that, regrettably, is where we are.
* * * * * * *
QUEstiOn and ansWEr sEssiOn
 Question: Could you elaborate on your opposition to military commissions, which 
you said, as a public policy matter, you were not in favor of. And if we do not have 
civilian trials in the United States and we do not have military commissions, what 
alternative do you propose?
 Judge Mukasey: We have had military commissions since the American Revolution. 
There was a military commission that convened as late as World War II when 
German saboteurs landed off Long Island, New York, and Florida in 1943 and were 
captured. On direct orders of the President, they were not taken to a civilian court; 
rather, they were put before a military commission, tried, and executed within three 
months. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court opinion upholding that entire procedure 
was issued after they were dead. However, we do not have any experience with 
military commissions on a long-term basis, and military commissions are something 
apart from the normal mandate of the military. The military services are there to 
fight and win wars, and military commissions are, from their standpoint, a sideshow. 
And justifiably so; I don’t mean this as a criticism of them. They are not within the 
mainstream of the mandate of the military. There is no promotion track for being 
successful long-term by prosecuting military commission cases. People do a limited 
term in the commissions and then move on to something else. There is no long-term 
mechanism in place, and I think there has to be a long-term mechanism in place, 
which is why I suggested creating a terrorism court. I think civilian courts create 
enormous security concerns, not to mention the fact that when we bring people 
within the reach of federal courts what we invite and what we are going to get—
because the lawyers involved have announced that is what we are going to get—is a 
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wave of litigation addressing the facts and the conditions of confinement of people 
who are brought here. And federal courts are going to be basically imposed upon 
with an enormous wave of litigation over each of these people.
 There are several hundred federal judges across the country. And I have to tell 
you that I yield to no one, at least to no one except several federal judges, in my 
admiration for the federal judiciary. However, there is always one federal judge who 
will release somebody on a habeas corpus writ on a claim that the person’s confinement 
is no longer warranted. That is not possible at Guantánamo, but it is possible once 
people get to the United States. And it will be particularly possible when and if we 
start withdrawing troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, which will then give rise to the 
claim that the war is over and therefore we cannot continue to hold people. So I find 
that part of it enormously dangerous, which is why I believe in a separate court.
 Question: I love your analogy to the Great Train Robbery—that the train has not 
been stolen, rather the contents have been stolen. The contents of our freedom and 
liberty have been stolen, not the U.S. Constitution, so to speak. What is your remedy 
for getting back the contents of the Constitution?
 Judge Mukasey: I am at a loss to know which of our liberties have been stolen. As 
far as I know, everybody remains free and, if you consult the blogs, remains quite 
free to launch whatever criticism and protest they want, fact-based and otherwise. I 
have never seen such a procession of people line up at microphones like this to 
complain that their free speech rights are being suppressed.
 Question: I am not complaining, and I am very much appreciative of your 
wonderful analogy. I am just concerned about how we get back the sense of freedom 
that we had. I think that is a better question.
 Judge Mukasey: We get back the sense of freedom that we had when we stop 
having to wake up every morning wondering whether a bomb is going to go off in 
the subways.
 Question: Do you still feel that the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques had 
sufficient legal support in the OLC memos that John Yoo and Bob Delahunt and 
others were involved in producing?
 Judge Mukasey: The short answer to your question, until you got to the last part 
of it, was yes. As far as John Yoo’s memos are concerned, those were withdrawn. I 
think that they were not well done and they had been redone. What is interesting 
about the fact that they were redone is the fact that the same conclusions were 
reached, namely, that the techniques were lawful. Torture has a meaning. It is not 
just an expression.
 As far as the enhanced interrogation techniques having sufficient legal support, 
there is a statute that bars the use of torture and defines torture as acting under color 
of law for the purpose of causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering. Mental 
pain or suffering is defined as having long-term consequences. Water boarding, I 
will tell you, creates virtually no physical pain and has no long-term consequences. 
Water boarding is used in Survival Evasion Resistance Escape (SERE) training for 
U.S. Army Special Forces and for Navy SEALS. And it has to be used with great 
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discretion in SERE training because it can be very demoralizing; the trainees always 
give up whatever it is they are trying to hold back.
 Question: I think you would recognize that there was extreme revulsion among 
the American people generally when it was learned what water boarding techniques 
were like.
 Judge Mukasey: I recognize that there was extreme revulsion against a general 
concept of water boarding based on what the Japanese did during World War II and 
what the Khmer Rouge did later on. This water boarding today bears no relation to 
that earlier form of water boarding. During World War II, the Japanese laid people 
down, pumped water down their stomachs, and then stood on their abdomens to 
push the water back up. They also forced them to eat raw rice and pumped water 
down their stomachs and waited until it distended and caused enormous pain. That 
is not what the CIA did. The Khmer Rouge handcuffed people to the bottom of 
barrels and poured water in until it reached over their heads. That was their idea of 
water boarding. Again, that is not what the CIA did. I will tell you that only three 
people, the three people I previously discussed—Zubaydah, KSM, and Nashiri—
were water boarded. That is it.
 Water boarding involves tying somebody down to a board, putting a cloth over 
his face, pouring water over his nose and mouth, and holding your hand over the 
cloth for periods of between twenty and forty seconds so that he cannot move his 
head to get the water away. That is it. What it creates is the panic that comes with 
drowning, and it creates this panic even if you know you are not drowning, which 
you know, of course, by the second or third time they do it. The trainees who undergo 
SERE training know that they are not going to be drowned, but it still works every 
single time. It works to force people to be cooperative.
 And it is not, by the way, a question of trying to get confessions out of people. I 
will concede that if you had water boarded KSM enough, he would have confessed to 
having shot Abraham Lincoln. Confessions are not the point; rather, intelligence is. 
When somebody lies to you in the course of questioning, you take them out and you 
engage in coercive techniques with the authorization of somebody at the deputy level 
or higher within the CIA. You then wait until he becomes more cooperative and 
then somebody who does the questioning comes in. It is not the same person the 
entire time.
 And the result is certainly not engaging in that technique until somebody 
discloses a particular piece of information and then running out and using the 
information. You take the information that you get, fit it into the grid of information 
that you already have to determine what it is that you are getting. What we received 
was enormously valuable and water boarding was not the only technique used. There 
were a whole lot of other unattractive techniques being used, such as sleep deprivation 
and walling, which involves banging somebody into a hollowed-out wall that makes 
a sound as if he is being pushed with a whole lot more force than he is, as well as 
open-handed slaps to the side of the head and the abdomen.
 Question: Obviously, you are in sharp disagreement with the current attorney 
general on a lot of issues.
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 Judge Mukasey: I have some policy disagreements with him, but I have some 
agreements with him, too. I think that the current Justice Department has been, in a 
quiet sort of way, enormously aggressive about pursuing leak cases. And I applaud 
them for that. I am deadly serious. I think that is an enormous problem, and they are 
serious about cracking down on it.
 Question: How much more difficult is it to conduct our anti-terrorist and anti-
jihad operations or relations with other countries when the current administration is 
not sympathetic to the techniques you described, the sanctions, or the attitude that 
you show? There is such a sharp difference between what you say and think and the 
way that anti-terrorism activities are now being conducted. Is that impeding our 
ability to fight and prevent further incidents?
 Judge Mukasey: It is not something that I can prove. I cited the Abdulmutallab 
incident and the incident in Times Square as examples of situations in which we 
could have gotten intelligence, but we did not. I do not know what other incidents 
there were or how many other incidences there were, but what I am saying is that 
going back to a criminal law paradigm is no way to do it. But that said, they have left 
in place, and are pursuing, the techniques that were approved for electronic 
surveillance. Those techniques are very much in place and obviously come in handy. 
But that is only part of the equation.
 Question: I would like to go back to your statement with regard to the difference 
between the military commissions and the civilian courts. Did I hear correctly that 
you found the possible right of acquittal reprehensible in the civilian courts?
 Judge Mukasey: No, I did not say that at all. What I said was that the fact of the 
acquittal due to the suppression of evidence was a regrettable result. But you cannot 
have a trial unless you have the possibility of an acquittal. Otherwise it is not a trial; 
it is a show trial. You also have the possibility of an acquittal in military courts; in 
fact, military courts generally, including courts-martial, have a higher record of 
acquittal than civilian courts. It was the fact and the manner of the acquittal in the 
Ghalani case that I objected to, not that acquittal is a reprehensible result.
